In a judgment dated August 4, 2026, the Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of the Judicial District of Bogotá (the “Court”), in compliance with a tutela (constitutional protection action) ruling issued by the Supreme Court of Justice (the “CSJ”), re-decided the appeals filed against the first-instance judgment ordering an insurance company (the “Insurer”) to compensate the relatives of the victim of a traffic accident.
The owner of the vehicle that caused the accident held a civil liability insurance policy offered and marketed through an insurance agency (the “Agency”). The distinctive feature of the case is that the coverage start date stated by the Agency in an “insurability card” delivered to the insured preceded the coverage start date set forth in the policy that the Insurer issued several weeks later. The traffic accident occurred precisely within the period between those two dates.
Brief summary of the facts
On August 23, 2014, in Supía (Caldas), a truck lost control and struck a man. His children sued the owner of the truck (the “Owner”) and the Insurer.
To understand the dispute over insurance coverage, the following dates must be considered:
- August 22, 2014: the Agency delivered to the Owner an insurability card evidencing civil liability coverage from 4:00 p.m. on August 22, 2014, to 4:00 p.m. on August 22, 2015.
- August 23, 2014: the accident occurred at approximately 3:30 p.m. (i.e., roughly 23 hours after the start of the coverage indicated by the Agency).
- August 25, 2014: commencement date of the civil liability coverage, according to the policy issued by the Insurer.
- September 26, 2014: date on which the Insurer issued the civil liability insurance policy.
The Agency acted as an insurance placement agency under an agreement entered into with the Insurer, the purpose of which was to promote, independently and at its own account and risk, the execution and renewal of the Insurer’s insurance contracts. That agreement prohibited the Agency from granting coverage or assuming risks on behalf of the Insurer without a special written power of attorney, which was not part of the case record.
At first instance, the judge held the Owner liable. The judge reasoned that, because insurance is a consensual contract, the consent of the Agency (acting on behalf of the insurer) and of the policyholder as to the essential elements of the insurance contract sufficed to consider it in force on the day of the accident.
On appeal, the Insurer argued that there was no evidence of a civil liability policy in force on the date of the accident, since the policy it issued took effect on August 25, 2014, that is, two days after the accident. It further argued that it could not be held liable on the basis of the card issued by the Agency.
On this occasion, the Court upheld the judgment against the Insurer and increased the award to COP 100 million, the full sum insured, on the following grounds:
The policy is only one of the means of proving an insurance contract
The Court noted that insurance is a consensual contract (Article 1036 of the Colombian Commercial Code) and that it may be proven in writing or by admission (Article 1046 of the Commercial Code).
Accordingly, the policy is not what gives rise to the insurance. The card delivered by the Agency served as evidence of the existence of the insurance, and the Insurer failed to rebut it:
“The document delivered by [the Agency], given the consensual nature of the contract, serves ‘exclusively evidentiary purposes’ (Art. 1046, Commercial Code), which were not rebutted.” (Emphasis added).
The acts of insurance agencies bind the insurer
Relying on Article 2.30.1.1.5 of Decree 2555 of 2010 and on CSJ case law, the Court explained that insurance agencies do not act on their own behalf but on behalf of the insurer, and that their acts are binding upon it.
In the tutela ruling, the CSJ noted that this representative role distinguishes insurance agencies from insurance brokers:
“Accordingly, it follows that insurance intermediaries, of whatever kind, do not act on their own behalf, but on behalf or in representation of others. However, pursuant to constitutional case law, ‘(…) insurance agents and agencies differ from insurance brokers in that, while the former represents insurance companies (…), brokers carry out their intermediation independently (…)’.” (Emphasis added).
Therefore, since the Agency offered coverage as of August 22, 2014, the Insurer became bound as of that date:
“Thus, [the Agency] having undertaken, by virtue of the document delivered to [the Owner], to provide coverage as of 4:00 p.m. on August 22, 2014, the existence of the insurance product is deemed consolidated as of that date, not only because a contract of this kind is consensual in nature, as the lower court rightly pointed out, but also because its conduct bound the company at that time, since, had the agreement under which it acted as its placement agent not been in force, [the Insurer] would not have delivered insurance contract No. 10007066.” (Emphasis added).
The Court considered that the agency agreement prohibited the Agency from granting coverage without a special written power of attorney, and that such power of attorney was not part of the case record.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court held that the absence of such power of attorney did not prevent the insurance offered by the Agency from binding the Insurer. The reason is that the Insurer itself ultimately issued the policy covering the same vehicle a few days later, which, moreover, already appeared on its list of policies pending issuance. For the Court, this indicated that, in this case, the Insurer’s express approval of coverage for that vehicle was not required:
“The fact that the insurance was granted by [the Insurer] indicates that, in this context, the explicit approval provided for in the placement agreement was not necessary; had it been indispensable, the policy in question would not exist.” (Emphasis added).
The discrepancy between the coverage period offered by the Agency and that of the policy issued does not release the insurer
The Court concluded that the Insurer could not disregard the coverage period offered by the Agency to the client, even though it subsequently issued a policy with a later start date and, consequently, the Insurer could not evade its obligation to pay:
“The discrepancy between the issuance date and the commencement of coverage stated in the document submitted by the defendant is insufficient to support its objection, since [the Agency], its placement agent, informed the client that its insurance would be active as of 4:00 p.m. on August 22, 2014, (…) because it acted as agent for the services offered by the organization, and therefore bound the defendant to cover the risks arising from the operation of [the Owner]’s truck from that earlier date.”
(…)
In short, the insurer cannot evade its obligation to respond for the event that affected [the victim], because [the Agency], in its role as insurance placement agent, acted in the name and on behalf of [the Insurer], pursuant to a prior agreement entered into for that purpose, as explained above.” (Emphasis added).